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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS - 
DIGITAL AUTOPILOT DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 
By Wi l l iam H. Peters  and K e n n e t h  J. Cox 
M a n n e d  Spacecraft C e n t e r  
SUMMARY 
The development of the Apollo digital autopilots, which a r e  the pr imary attitude 
control systems, is summarized for the lunar module and the command-service mod- 
ule. The digital autopilots provide attitude control during all phases of the Apollo 
mission, including a backup mode for boost into ear th  orbit, coasting flight, velocity- 
change maneuvers, lunar landing, boost into lunar orbit, docking, and entry into ear th  
atmosphere. 
The development-process functions and the essential information flow paths a r e  
identified. This identification provides information on the particular NASA/contractor 
interface as well as the relationships between the many individual activities. A list 
of pr imary functional requirements is presented as a prelude to the discussions of 
command-service module and lunar module digital autopilot development. Specific 
problem a r e a s  that existed during the design-development phase a r e  discussed in detail, 
including the solutions that evolved. The report concludes with a discussion of flight 
test data f rom the Apollo flights that are pertinent to the demonstration of performance 
of these attitude control systems. 
The pr imary  conclusion concerns the benefits inherent in mechanizing controller 
This mechanization provided logic and signal-shaping dynamics in a digital computer. 
the flexibility necessary to avoid expensive hardware changes and potential schedule 
delays and provided a large capacity for performing complicated control- system logic 
with essentially no hardware impact. The feasibility and reliability of this approach 
have been thoroughly demonstrated by the Apollo Program. Other significant conclu- 
sions include the following. 
1. Requirements f o r  monitoring system performance can place constraints on the 
control-system design. 
2. The danger of preventing proper control computations (and subsequent actions) 
arises if logic branching is too sensitive to predicted plant parameters.  
3. Refined analytical techniques a r e  necessary to reduce the amount of reliance 
on large-scale  simulations f o r  design verification. 
~ INTRODUCTION 
The original Apollo Program concept for obtaining a highly reliable attitude con- 
trol  system fo r  the command-service module (CSM) was to ca r ry  spa re  equipment and 
perform inflight maintenance if necessary. Because of several  difficulties inherent i n  
this approach and because of a realization that redundant attitude control systems could 
be provided by using baseline electronic equipment, on the condition that a complete 
attitude-controller logic could be implemented in the guidance and navigation (G&N) 
computer, a decision was made to use digital autopilots. A t  that time, only limited 
flight experience using digital control systems existed. Because it was not known at the 
t ime whether CSM/lunar module (LM) powered-flight attitude control could be accom- 
. plished by digital computer logic, a parallel development of a technological backup 
existed. This alternate approach would have relied on the digital computer only to pro- 
vide backup attitude information. Subsequent studies demonstrated the feasibility of 
using digital autopilot (DAP) control for  this phase of flight, and the technological back- 
up was dropped. 
A broad overview of the Apollo DAP development process and specific problem 
areas encountered during development of the Apollo digital autopilots are discussed. 
The first sections of the report  are applicable to all the DAP designs that were used 
during different phases of the mission. In later sections, the material is separated 
into discussions relating to the CSM DAP and the LM DAP. The discussion places 
emphasis on the  CSM and LM thrust vector control (TVC) DAP, because more problems 
were associated with the development of the digital controllers for powered flight than 
with the development of those for coasting flight and entry. 
The control systems that are the subject of this report  have been described in 
detail elsewhere (refs. 1 to 4), and the material presented herein is descriptive only to 
the point of illustrating g ross  concepts or  particular design problems. The problem 
discussions are written for  the control- system engineer, but they do not necessarily 
require an intimate knowledge of the Apollo control- system designs. 
GENERAL 
Before the specific DAP designs are discussed by mission phase, general com- 
ments that a r e  applicable for all the CSM and LM control-system developments will be 
presented. Topics that will be treated are the NASA and contractor functions and as- 
pects of the developmental process, the general DAP functional requirements, and the 
preflight testing and verification philosophy used in the design development. 
Development P m e s s  
The significant elements of the developmental p rocess  are diagramed in figure 1. 
Much of the developmental activity involved the block labeled "Modifications, " as indi- 
cated by the numerous interface loops. The flexibility f o r  incorporating design modifi- 
cations into a digital control system in a straightforward, easy, and inexpensive 
manner (compared to changes in conventional hardware systems),  and also at a later 
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Figure 1. - Digital autopilot 
developmental p ro  c e s s . 
date in  the developmental program than 
would normally be allowed, gives the de- 
signer freedom in the form of extended de- 
velopmental t ime and the type of changes 
that will be tolerated at a particular point 
in the developmental schedule. 
The activities diagramed in figure 1 
depict the NASA functions on the left and 
the contractor functions on the right. Such 
a representation is not exact, however, for . 
the flow lines represent only approximately 
the interactions that actually occurred. In 
the paragraphs that follow, some of the 
significant blocks in figure 1 a r e  discussed 
in some detail. 
The technical interchange meetings 
proved an invaluable extension of the tech- 
nical monitoring function for tracking the 
developmental status and for planning future 
emphasis on the existing problems. The 
guidance system operations plan (GSOP) 
constituted the pr imary control documenta- 
tion, and the GSOP review function provided 
the checkpoint for assur ing that detailed re- 
quirements would be implemented. 
The bit- by-bit simulations were digital programs that caused a general-purpose 
computer to function like the airborne computer hardware and provided detailed diag- 
nostic information on flight software coding problems. The hybrid simulations coupled 
actual flight-type hardware into computer simulations of spacecraft dynamics. The in- 
dependent design and software verification consisted primarily of simulations per- 
formed at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and the spacecraft contractor 
laboratories, where both bit-by-bit and hybrid simulations were used. 
After  the software had been developed sufficiently that the schedule required con- 
figuration control, software milestone meetings gradually replaced technical- 
interchange meetings. Beyond this point, design-improvement changes were allowed 
only if justifiable to the software configuration control board. 
Fu nct iona i Req u i remen t s 
A comprehensive and realistic set  of quantitative requirements for any complex 
subsystem is difficult to list at the onset of a developmental program. This  difficulty 
is caused pr imari ly  by an  initial lack of knowledge concerning all the interactions be- 
tween the par t icular  subsystem and the total system environment with which the sub- 
sys tem must ultimately be compatible. However, the quantitative requirements that 
gradually evolve during the developmental process are primarily design details that 
3 
can be considered subordinate to a set of more basic functional requirements. The 
hierarchy of functional requirements f o r  the Apollo command module (CM), CSM, 
CSM/LM, LM/CSM, LM-descent, and LM-ascent control systems are as follows. 
1. Maintenance of attitude orientation sufficiently near a commanded orientation 
during accumulation of velocity f rom a rocket-engine burn, during coasting flight, and 
during entry into the ear th  atmosphere 
2. Provision of acceptable thrust-impulse economy. This requirement implies 
operation within the constraints of the total reaction-control propellant available 
3. Provision of an attitude-control loop responsive enough to prevent dynamic 
interference with the guidance scheme 
4. Provision of compensation for rigid-body motion, including time-varying 
gains to provide f o r  inertia changes as a result of propellant consumption o r  stage- 
configuration changes 
5. Provision of compensation for thrust-vector misalinement and other disturb- 
ance torques 
6. Provision of compensation for propellant-sloshing and structural-bending 
resonances, a requirement implying operation within the constraints of structural  load 
l imits 
7. Provision of stability margins of sufficient magnitude to guarantee the sta- 
bility of guidance long-period modes, attitude short-period modes, propellant-sloshing 
resonances, and structural- bending resonances 
8. Provision of acceptable performance in convergence from la rge  transients 
and in the steady-state limit cycles 
9. Maintenance of attitude e r r o r s  and vehicle r a t e s  within bounds compatible 
with effective crew monitoring of successful performance 
10. Provision of a capability for  switching to a redundant controller in case  of 
a malfunction 
The te rms  "sufficiently near, '' "acceptable, and so on were not specified quantita- 
tively i n  all cases.  However, the requirements were closely monitored by cognizant 
NASA engineers during the developmental phase, and requirements for design improve- 
ments were negotiated on several occasions. 
Pref l ight  Testing and Verif icat ion 
The primary objectives of preflight testing were to validate the control-system 
performance during nominal, off-nominal, failure, and mission-related conditions. 
The types of simulation facilities used included the engineering digital simulator, the 
interpretive computer simulator (ICs), and the hybrid simulator. 
4 
Engineering digital simulators were used during the initial developmental and 
modification phases to provide dynamic validation and performance evaluation of the 
functional design under a broad spectrum of mission conditions. The bit-by-bit ICs 
modeled the detailed computer characterist ics and was used to verify the proper t rans-  
lation of the functional designs into software programs that were compatible with the 
flight-computer characterist ics and other interfacing software programs. Parameter  
studies associated with off -nominal performance generally cannot be run efficiently on 
the ICs. However, nominal performance verification was conducted on a mission-by- 
mission basis. The hybrid simulators were used to verify hardware/software inter- 
faces  and to provide overall system-performance validation. With respect to the digi- 
tal autopilots, both the design-validation and mission-verification testing programs 
were conducted on hybrid simulators. All  flight control modes were tested for both 
nominal and off-nominal conditions. The types of testing a r e  listed in table I. 
TABLE I. - DIGITAL AUTOPILOT TESTING MATRM 
Flight mode 
Coasting 
Powered 
Test condition 
Limit-cycle characterietics 
Transient behavior (acquisition and recovery ) 
Manual/automatic attitude maneuver 
Translation/ullage maneuver 
Off-nominal performance fiet failures, mass  
mismatches, res ta r t s ,  thrust 
misalinements) 
Stability/controllability characteristics 
Initial start transient performance 
(misalinement) 
Transient behavior (acquisition and recovery) 
Limit-cycle characteristics 
Off-nominal performance (actuator degrada- 
tions, failures, mass  mismatches, 
res ta r t s ,  degraded thrust) 
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In addition to the testing outlined in table I, special test conditions included 
(1) control-mode-switching transients, (2) structural loads and structural-stability 
evaluation with jet failures and off-nominal bending data, and (3) powered-flight tran- 
sients for hardover actuator failures. The control systems were subjected to realis- 
tic flight-environment testing, which included evaluation of the effects of propellant 
shift and engine-mount compliance. Throughout the Apollo Program, verification-run 
matrices for both ICs and hybrid-simulator testing were extensive. 
COMMAND-SERV I CE MODULE D I G ITAL AUTOP I LOT DEVELOPMENT 
The CSM DAP provides stabilization and control of the CSM during both coasting 
. and powered flight. The CM DAP, on the other hand, is required to provide stabiliza- 
tion and control of the CM only during coasting flight. The development of the specific 
designs is reviewed by first outlining the vehicle design constraints and discussing the 
design philosophy. Later, brief design descriptions are given to provide general back- 
ground; then significant design-development problems are discussed. 
Vehic le  Design Con st ra i  n t s  
The basic Apollo vehicle configuration and control- system hardware configura- 
tion were established in advance of the bulk of the detailed digital-control-system design 
work. This early development of configurations forced the evolution of detailed digital- 
control-system designs that were subject to the constraints imposed by (1) vehicle 
structure, (2) propulsive devices, (3) total reaction-control propellant, (4) service 
module engine actuators, and (5) digital computer. 
in the sections that follow. 
Each constraint will be discussed 
Vehicle structure. - The pr imary constraints imposed by the structure were the 
potential instabilities of propellant-sloshing and flexible- body resonances during main- 
engine operation and a potential fo r  excessive structural  loads because of reaction-jet 
torque pulses. The excessive structural loads were primarily the result  of a failure- 
mode situation whereby excessive energy could be t ransferred to the structural  reso- 
nances without a classical control-system instability. This condition was due to the 
fact that the disturbance torque present with a failed-on reaction-jet thruster was equal 
to the net restoring torque present when the control torque was applied. The resulting 
thruster  duty cycle would be 0. 5 and could conceivably contain high energy at the 
bending-resonance frequency. 
Propulsive devices. - The reaction-jet thrusters  had a duty-cycle constraint, a 
minimum tolerable "ontime" command of 14 milliseconds, and sizable pulse-on and 
pulse-off delays. 
pellant tanks arranged so that considerable lateral movement of the vehicle center of 
m a s s  occurred during a main-engine burn. Also, the engine throat was cooled by a n  
ablative material that could erode in such a manner that thrust-vector alinement rela- 
tive to the engine centerline could change with t ime during a burn. These SPS problems 
were both jerk disturbances. Several engine, engine-actuator, and structural  charac- 
te r i s t ics  contributed to a substantial uncertainty in the initial thrust-vector alinement 
The service propulsion system (SPS) had four long, cylindrical pro- 
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t 
I relative to the total vehicle center of mass. This alinement uncertainty produced an 
I initial acceleration disturbance. 
Total reaction-control propellant. - The total impulse capacity of the reaction- 1 
I 
control propellants caused initial concern to the control- system designers because no 
method for  accurately predicting analytically the effects of zero-g propellant-slosh 
dynamics existed. Fo r  example, the residual kinetic energy in the SPS propellants 
after main-engine shutdown might require substantial amounts of reaction-control- 
propellant expenditure to damp attitude motions resulting f rom the propellant forces  
on the tank walls. Fortunately, flight test results indicated that this expenditure was 
of no serious consequence, probably because attitude-error perturbations were filtered 
by the control-logic dead band. Considerable effort was expended on zero-g slosh 
models, but no tenable models evolved that were substantiated by Apollo flight results. 
g rees  of freedom that would be required for a realistic model, which would make the 
results almost entirely dependent on numerous initial conditions that cannot be 
deter mined. 
t 
, The pr imary problem is caused by the long time constants involved and the many de- 
Service module engine actuators. - The SPS engine actuators were electromechan- 
ical devices (motors, gears ,  and jackscrews) that had torque and rate limits. In addi- 
tion, the engine was not mass  balanced, and therefore a potential dynamic interaction 
existed between structural bending and TVC. This interaction is a type of dynamic 
coupling referred to in reference 5 as "dog-wags-tail. '' 
Digital computer. - Fortunately, the computer capacity for  control logic and 
computation rates did not result in significant constraints on the control- system design, 
nor did the data quantization of the digital-to-analog converters produce significant 
limit cycling. The limit cycling that did occur during TVC was  primarily due to a 
quantization-induced limit cycle in the guidance loop. 
Design Philosophy 
A s  implied by previous statements, an original philosophy was  that optimum 
reaction control system (RCS) propeliant- consumption efficiency must be maintained 
at all t imes because of a limited rotational-impulse budget. A s  the total RCS propellant 
budget matured, it was realized that the percentage of the total budget being allocated 
to attitude hold was small, because most of the propellants were required for nominal 
translations and maneuvers and for emergency reserves. Therefore, a 20-percent- 
above-optimum-usage ra te  for attitude hold would represent a penalty that barely 
affected the noise level of budgeting uncertainty. Therefore, the optimum solutions 
could be detuned to make them more tolerant to plant-modeling uncertainty. 
Another design philosophy used with success in  the development of the reaction- 
jet attitude-control- system designs for the Apollo Program was  plant modeling. This 
philosophy was neither the model-following adaptive technique nor cancellation compen- 
sation to change the plant-response characteristics, but simply the technique of basing 
control actions on a predicted plant response. This technique provided valuable lead 
t ime in  the control loop, and this added time helped wash out the delays associated with 
data sampling, transport lags, and state estimation. This technique is valuable for re -  
ducing the control- sample frequency and attendant computer-load factor. Furthermore,  
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this technique is essentially trouble-free if the prediction is updated during each control 
cycle and if the control cycle is small compared to significant plant and disturbance- 
t ime constants. Each update tends to wash out any e r r o r s  made in the previous predic- 
tion, so  that the prediction e r r o r  diminishes with the control-loop e r ro r ,  and the final 
prediction e r r o r  is only that e r r o r  associated with a prediction for a control action 
lasting less than one control sample period. 
Early planning budgeted approximately 20 percent of computer t ime to the control 
task; and, like most things that a r e  budgeted in advance, the control computations grew 
to consume the budget at some points in the mission. This total-computer-budget usage 
occurred only in portions of powered flight, and, even in  these cases, economies could 
have been effected, i f  necessary. Some reserve  capacity was used to build in addition- 
al flexibility as a hedge against changes in requirements. An example of this reserve  
capacity is the early use of a seventh-order compensation filter (later changed to sixth 
order )  for  control during CSM/LM-docked SPS burns, when studies had shown that a 
fourth-order filter would suffice for  the plant dynamics known at that time. The filter 
coefficients were placed in the erasable memory, which permitted use of lower order  
filters, if desired. 
. 
I 
I 
Another a r e a  that could be called a design philosophy, but in reality concerned a 
specific design requirement, was the frequency-band-pass requirement for the pitch 
and yaw attitude control systems during a CSM/LM-docked SPS burn. This require- 
ment should be as high as possible and consistent with an adequate high-frequency sta- 
bility margin, but disagreement occurred on what margin was adequate. A conservative 
approach was  taken initially, in which it was attempted to make the passband as low as 
possible and consistent with adequate low-frequency performance. Later ,  af ter  an 
inflight test increased confidence in the structural character is t ics  and after several  
actual flight demonstrations, the passband was increased, and the higher performance 
gains were used for the lunar landing mission. 
Des ig n Desc r i pt i on 
Because the Apollo mission required a modular spacecraft that operated in many 
different configurations, several separate and unique control problems occurred. To 
compress developmental schedules, the contractor assigned different individuals the 
responsibilities of designing mission-control programs that would control (1) command 
module computer (CMC) backup to a Saturn rocket boost, (2) CSM o r  CSM/LM coast, 
(3) CSM (alone) powered, (4) CSM/LM powered, and (5) CM preentry and entry. There- 
fore,  each of these phases can be viewed as independent control-system designs and 
implementations, because little program coding was shared by these control routines. 
The.following material briefly descr ibes  the control system for each of these mission 
phases. 
. Command module computer backup to a Saturn rocket boost. - This mode per- 
formed the function of closing the Saturn control-system attitude-error loop in the CSM 
and permitted the astronaut to perform a guided function manually. This procedure 
provides a backup to the inertial platform in the Saturn instrument unit. The desired 
attitude is computed from a polynomial function of t ime during first-stage flight, and 
the resulting attitude e r r o r s  a r e  sent to the flight control computer in the instrument 
unit. The astronaut compares the CMC-displayed quantities of velocity magnitude, 
8 
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altitude, and altitude rate against predetermined desired values and i ssues  rate com- 
mands to the Saturn instrument unit by hand-controller motion. 
Command- service module o r  CSM/LM coast. - The CSM coasting-flight digital 
autopilots u se  a digital filter algorithm to estimate attitude ra te  f rom noisy platform 
gimbal-angle measurements and estimates of applied control effectiveness. A phase- 
plane switching logic is used that contains hysteresis. Control torques are available 
f rom four quadrants (quads) of four reaction-jet thrusters.  The thrus te rs  in each quad 
provide positive and negative forces  that lie approximately along lines parallel with two 
of the spacecraft body axes. Either pitch-plane quads o r  yaw-plane quads can be speci- 
fied for roll control o r  X-translation commands (or both). Furthermore,  any combina-- 
tion of quads can be specified as nonusable, and the DAP will attempt to use  only the 
remaining usable quads. Attitude dead bands and maneuver rates can be changed 
through either astronaut o r  ground-station commands. Hand-controller inputs a r e  
given priority over automatic control and are "hot" at all times. A specified maneuver 
rate results f rom hand-controller action. Simultaneous three-axis maneuvers result 
when the automatic-maneuver routine is used. This routine rotates the spacecraft about 
the single axis normal to the plane including the current  longitudinal axis and the longi- 
tudinal axis at the new desired orientation for  all conditions except gimbal-lock avoid- 
ance. The phase-plane switching logic used during an automatic maneuver is the same 
as that used for attitude hold. The position constraint causes the actual rate to limit- 
cycle about the desired rate. For  the CSM/coasting-flight autopilot, the control sample 
period is 100 milliseconds. 
Command-service module (alone) powered. - The digital compensation filter to 
CSM powered flight is third order ,  with a zero-frequency gain that is initialized from 
computer knowledge of control effectiveness. During the SPS engine burn, the gain is 
decremented at 10-second intervals to account fo r  the increase in  control power result- 
ing from reduced propellant load. The SPS engine gimbal-drive system was tested be- 
fore  a burn and positioned at the attitude of the expected t r i m  position. The control 
sample period is 40 milliseconds. 
Command- service module/lunar module powered. - The CSM/LM attitude control- 
ler for powered flight was originally seventh order (later changed to sixth order). The 
gain is also initialized and decremented every 10  seconds, as discussed for the CSM. 
In the original design concept, a burn would begin with the use  of a control sample 
period of 40 miIliseconds; but, after 7 seconds of burn time, the gain was changed, and 
the control sample period was increased to 80 milliseconds. The 40-millisecond DAP 
(termed MOD 40) was originally intended for use throughout the burn, but switching to 
the 80- millisecond DAP (termed MOD 80) increased the high-frequency stability 
margins. 
Another feature of the CSM and CSM/LM powered-flight digital autopilots is a 
thrust-alinement tracking loop, which computes the average gimbal-position command 
and re turns  it to gimbal command as a bias. This feature prevents initial-thrust- 
alinement e r r o r  f rom producing a bias i n  the attitude e r ro r ,  which would prohibit use  
of attitude e r r o r  as an indicator of proper system performance (to give the astronauts 
real- t ime monitoring information). 
Command module preentry and entry. - The CM digital autopilots exercised atti- 
tude control by selecting jets for  firing f rom a set of six (or 12) reaction-control jets 
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on the CM. 
entry so  that the entry DAP had to perform ra te  damping only for  these two axes. The 
entry guidance supplied commands for rotating the lift vector about the velocity vector; 
therefore, transformations were performed to provide attitude control about the roll- 
stability axis. The exoatmospheric phase of entry DAP operation provided attitude 
control about all three axes, and mode switching occurred as a function of measured 
acceleration. 
The CM was aerodynamically stable about the pitch and yaw axes during 
Des ig n - D eve I op m e n t P rob I em s 
Service propulsion system engine-actuator performance. - During the summer 
of 1965, the SPS engine actuator was  not meeting performance specifications. The 
electromechanical (motor, gears,  and jackscrews) actuator w a s  supposed to be able to 
slew the SPS engine position at a steady-state rate of 0. 36 rad/sec, but the first units 
delivered were capable of only 0.2 rad/sec. Severe heating problems resulted in a 
requirement to reduce the maximum actuator rate even further o r  to subject the actua- 
to r  to major redesign. This added requirement caused NASA and contractor personnel 
to t ry  to find the minimum engine-actuator rate that would be compatible with Apollo 
attitude-control requirements. 
The factors necessary to establish this requirement were as follows. 
1. The attitude-control passband requirement (set by the guidance requirement) 
2. Flexible-body and propellant- slosh stability (To guarantee a stability margin 
by an analytical process, significant nonlinearities had to be avoided. ) 
3. Rigid-body recovery from large transients 
4. Sound system-design principles 
5. Cost and schedule factors 
Item 1 established only mild requirements for fast actuator response. Spacecraft guid- 
ance is primarily a low-frequency phenomenon and is fair ly  insensitive to temporary 
saturation of inner-loop signals, unless these lead to inner-loop instabilities. 
The requirement for linear response to structural  oscillations is more difficult 
to ascertain but can be estimated by assuming that only one o r  two of the low-order 
modes are excited to near the point of structural  failure.  This requirement is then 
inteFpreted in  t e rms  of actuator command as a function of attitude-sensor location and 
the dynamic gain in the controller. Because of the attenuation being proposed for the 
CSM/LM TVC DAP at frequencies near  and above the f i rs t -mode resonance, the actu- 
a t o r  command w a s  essentially independent of the bending motions. 
bending o r  propellant-slosh resonances are phase stabilized, it is important that the 
maximum expected excitation not saturate TVC, because a la rge  signal instability can 
result. 
In cases  where 
Item 3 proved the major constraint on the SpS-actuator r a t e  requirement. Ana- 
log simulations of CSM attitude control, using the backup control system and an  actuator 
1 0  
rate limit of 0.1 rad/sec, demonstrated a large signal instability; that is, vehicle atti- 
tude wocld not converge properly f rom large initial tumbling rates. Additional studies 
indicated that an  actuator ra te  capability of 0.15 rad/sec was desirable to avoid changes 
in  the control- system hardware. 
Item 4 stipulates that a designer must not overconstrain the design problem. 
This requirement implies conservatism when constraints are being adjusted, because 
all possible ramifications are difficult to predict. For the case  under discussion, the 
cost and schedule implications (payoff function) were heavily weighted toward accepting 
some r i sk  of la ter  difficulty in other a r e a s  (e. g., incurring a requirement for future 
changes to hardware in the backup control-system hardware). A s  a result of these con- 
flicting factors, the minimum specification finally agreed upon by NASA and contractor 
personnel (0.1 rad/sec) was not conservative; however, actual delivered hardware per -  
formed considerably better than this minimum requirement. The final hardware was 
capable of slewing the SPS engine at approximately 0.15 rad/sec, and backup control- 
system gains had been lowered so that an adequately large signal-stability margin was 
obtained. 
Thrust-vector-control filter mechanization. - The single-axis attitude-control 
loop compensation for the LM attached to the CSM was synthesized by the guidance and 
control contractor to be a seventh-order filter. The first attempt at a digital mechani- 
zation of these dvnamics was a straightforward, recursive computation performed by 
shifting all data by one step each coGputa- 
tion cycle before multiplying by the appro- 
priate coefficients and summing. This 
process  is shown schematically in figure 2, 
-1 where z represents  a delay of one com- 
putational interval. The gains a r e  simply 
the coefficients of the numerator and de- 
nominator polynomials of the z-transform 
version of the fi l ter  dynamics (ref. 6). 
The reference designates this method as 
"direct programing. " 
The straightforward approach did not 
work satisfactorily for the reasons dis- 
cussed in detail in reference 7. Briefly, 
the cause was a result  of repetitive trun- 
cation e r r o r  in the computational process, 
because each intermediate result had to be 
s tored  in a finite word-length register.  
The effect was to shift the effective loca- 
tion of some filter poles into the right half 
plane, causing the filter to be unstable. 
After some study of this problem by the 
guidance and control contractor, the 
second approach discussed in reference 4, 
called "iterative programing, " was adopt- 
ed. This  technique separates  the factored 
fo rm of the filter transfer function into a 
product of two or  more (three in the case 
Input 0- 
Past 
input 
value 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
41 h 
51 h 
6th 
71 h 
Filler scaling gain Filter variable gain 
ut 
Ni =Numerator  coefficient 
Di = Denominator coefficient 
K = Current  f i l ter  gain 
Kn = Design-nominal gain 
Figure 2. - Original CSM/LM filter 
rnec hanization. 
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under discussion) smaller  filters, implements these, and allows the output of the first 
to be the input of the second, and so on. The final Apollo TVC DAP filter mechaniza- 
tion is discussed in references 1 and 2; the earlier version, i n  reference 3. 
Plant-model deficiencies. - A straightforward synthesis of filter dynamics neces- 
s a ry  for stable operation during an SPS engine burn would have been possible only if 
complete confidence in the mathematical model of the plant dynamics had existed. This 
model includes not only the mathematical formulation of the model, but also the pro- 
graming of that model into the digital computer simulations being used to verify the 
filter design. Generally, the required mathematical formulations have existed fo r  
some time, but a problem exists because of the multitude of variables and a desire  to 
eliminate unnecessary coupling t e r m s  to reduce simulator complexity. This reduction 
results in simplified equation sets being published in various reports, and whether o r  
not a specified reduced set is applicable to a specified situation is impossible to deter- 
mine unless the missing t e r m s  are available for  inspection and evaluation. Two exam- 
ples of this type of problem that arose during the development of the Apollo CSM TVC 
DAP concerned the stability of propellant-slosh resonances and a potential instability 
in the airframe and engine dynamics. 
Early evaluation of the single-plane dynamics of the Apollo CSM/LM, performed 
independently by MSC personnel and by a support contractor, consistently disagreed 
with the guidance and control contractor results regarding stability of propellant-slosh 
resonances. The guidance and control contractor resul ts  showed the CSM propellant 
sloshing to be the mo;e severe but with an acceptable stability margin, whereas the 
other analyses indicated the LM propellant sloshing to be more severe and to have un- 
acceptable stability margins. A thorough investigation of the models showed that cou- 
pling with the translational degree of freedom produced this disparity of results. The 
MSC and support contractor models had both been derived under the assumption that 
this coupling was small enough to be ignored for  evaluation of high-frequency rotational 
dynamics. 
Another early plant-model deficiency was the omission of coupling t e r m s  that can 
give rise to a type of flutter instability. The MSC studies had shown that the combined 
airframe and actuator dynamics could be unstable without any attitude-controller inputs 
to the actuator. The energy source was the thrust force, and the feedback path was in- 
ertial forces on the engine because of structural  oscillations, causing engine-gimbaling 
motion. This effect has been termed "dog-wags-tail" as opposed to the other a i r f rame 
and engine dynamic coupling known as "tail-wags-dog. 1 f  Early contractor models had 
omitted these terms.  This coupling does reduce damping of the first two structural  
resonances of the Apollo CSM/LM vehicle, but not to the point of instability. If the 
coupling had reduced the damping to the point of instability, then the adopted DAP f i l -  
t e r  design approach of providing large attenuation to bending signals (gain stabilization) 
would not have produced an acceptable design. Active compensation at the first 
bending-mode frequency would have been required. 
Structural-bending data.- The availability of data to be used in the models was the 
overriding problem of the entire TVC DAp developmental process.  The difficulties 
began i n  the spring of 1965 when a decision was reached that a combined CSM/LM struc- 
tural-dynamics test, which had been planned, could be eliminated f r o m  the program. 
This deficiency was later compounded when another decision was made to designate the 
inline responsibility for definition of combined-vehicle structural  dynamics to MSC 
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Personnel instead of to one of the Apollo spacecraft p r ime contractors. The result  was 
a period of confusion regarding data to define airf rame dynamics. 
The idea of an  inflight dynamics test  was proposed in October 1965. The 
structural-dynamics specialists had hopes of getting some data f rom this test  that could 
be used to calibrate their analytical models in lieu of the ground testing that had been 
deleted, but the required additional telemetry measurements were not sanctioned by 
program management. A limited version of the originally planned test was performed. 
An MSC contractor. computed the first set of three-dimensional mode shapes for 
the combined Apollo vehicle in February 1966, 2 yea r s  after the initial TVC controller 
synthesis. This effort predicted a first-mode frequency approximately 1 octave lower 
than former predictions (roughly 1. 0 hertz as opposed to 2.0 hertz). Obviously, this 
lower prediction seriously degraded the confidence in the quality of any bending data in  
existence at that t ime and probably was the most significant factor in  getting dynamics 
ground testing of the combined vehicle back into the program. 
Ground testing was reinstated; but, because of scheduling problems, test  prepa- 
ration, test performance, data reduction, and other considerations, the results were 
not available until December 1968. In the interim, the detailed structural-dynamics 
modeling being performed by NASA personnel produced the first set  of realistic three- 
dimensional mode shapes, part  of which were made available in June 1967. This essen- 
tial lack of credible bending data for the 18-month period encompassing 1966 and the 
first half of 1967 precipitated the next two problems. 
Change from MOD 40 to MOD 80. - During the summer of 1966, just before publi- 
cation of the GSOP that would specify the software to be used in the first mission con- 
taining a CSM/LM-docked SPS engine burn (ref. 3), the guidance and control contractor 
decided that additional conservatism regarding the high-frequency stability margin was 
required. (The estimates of the first bending-mode frequency existing at that t ime w a s  
nearly 1 octave below the nominal first-mode frequency used in the initial DAP filter 
synthesis. ) The design change that w a s  implemented at that point is a good example of 
the flexibility available to the digital- control- system designer; this flexibility would 
not be available if the control-system design were being translated into hardware. 
The change represented a radical departure f rom the former concept of a single- 
stage compensation fi l ter  with fixed dynamics and time-varying gain. The original 
design had the filter coefficients selected for  a sample interval of once each 40 milli- 
seconds (MOD 40). The new concept was, after starting the burn with the originally 
designed filter, to switch gains and sampling interval after a partial nulling of the start 
transients. A thrust-misalinement-correcting inner loop was also added. 
The postswitch filter dynamics, because of a sampling interval of 80 milliseconds 
(MOD 80), were  essentially the same as those of the MOD 40, except that the real f re -  
quency where a given shaping effect would occur was now 1 octave lower. This charac- 
terist ic of a digital f i l ter-can be explained by reference to the relationship between real  
frequency w and the fictitious w-plane frequency v. In reference 6, this relationship 
1 3  
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is shown to be v = tan (wT/2) where T is the sample period in seconds. A specific 
value of v, say vo, is uniquely related to the real frequency only through the sampling 
interval. Hence 
vo = tan WoTo = tan [: - ( 2 ) ( C T O j  
implies that the specific real  frequency where a given amount of attenuation and phase 
shift would occur is shifted by the inverse of any scale factor C applied to the Sam- 
pling interval. This shift is an important flexibility that is available in a digital filter 
but is not available in filters implemented by hardware components. Hardware filters 
have a n  inherent sense of real t ime based upon the physical and geometrical aspects 
of the hardware, whereas a digital filter is a mathematic entity and, therefore, is 
insensitive to real  time. For this reason, extremely low frequency filtering can be 
done digitally in situations where the same job would be impossible to perform with 
hardware. 
Mathematical proof that real-frequency scaling and sample-period scaling are 
related is beyond the scope of this report. However, a convincing argument is avail- 
able. Because the digital filter is synthesized in the w-plane (poles and ze ros  arranged 
to supply a specific filtering action for a specific value of w-plane frequency v ) and 
because the bilinear transformation into the z-plane is not a function of sampling inter- 
val, then a given set of digital filter coefficients will provide the same filtering fo r  a 
given v regardless of the sampling interval involved. 
0 
0 
This particular change is listed as one of the TVC DAP developmental problems 
because the passband of the MOD 40 design (approximately 0.6 rad/sec) was already 
low, and th is  change brought the passband down to approximately 0. 3 rad/sec. The 
resulting performance was significantly degraded, and a considerable amount of effort 
was required i n  tuning up the guidance and control interface and in trying to contain the 
attitude e r r o r s  within reasonable bounds. The result  was a n  NASA directive to the con- 
t ractor  to produce an uprated TVC design based on the assumption that the current esti- 
mates of bending frequencies were accurate within +30 percent. The low-gain DAP was 
flown on the Apollo 9 mission, but the uprated design was used on all subsequent 
missions. 
Guidance and control interaction. - The low-gain attitude-control loop first im- 
plemented for the CSM TVC DAP would permit  large-peak-attitude-error transients 
and steady-state offset attitudes, resulting f r o m  initial-thrust-torque bias. The design 
change implemented to attack this problem, still with the assumption that the low gain 
was necessary for conservatism on the high-frequency stability margin, was to add an 
inner loop that would extract the average commanded engine position and return this 
information to the engine position command as a bias. The digital filter used for  this 
purpose had large time constants to avoid interaction with the attitude short-period 
mode, resulting in additional phase lags at frequencies that now coupled with guidance 
(outer-loop) performance. Also, the long t ime period required to initialize properly 
the thrust-position filter (i. e . ,  to find the t r i m  position) reduced the effectiveness of 
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this approach for  limiting the initial attitude excursions. Therefore, large guidance 
e r r o r s  that could not be completely removed in short burns could still accumulate 
during the first few seconds of a burn. 
The thrust-misalinement correction loop was not completely ineffective. The 
main purpose of the correction loop was to remove large steady-state attitude e r r o r s  
required to provide acceleration t r im  so that  an attitude e r r o r  could be used by a crew 
man to determine if the maneuver were progressing normally. 
Mechanization of the guidance and control interface can produce, o r  aggravate, 
guidance and control interaction problems. The evolution of the interface used in the 
Apollo guidance and control system is shown in figures 3 to 5. The guidance law pro- 
duces a desired acceleration-vector rate command that is proportional to the sensed 
acceleration-direction e r ro r .  The steady-state acceleration direction is very nearly 
the attitude of the vehicle longitudinal axis, but this case  is not t rue  when control 
torques a r e  being commanded. Therefore, a requirement exists to provide stable- 
attitude inner-loop control by using attitude-position feedback. 
! Gimbal 
p t  T ; 2  w w  1 - 2-l I T  = 0.08- e r r o r  Attitude 
sec !set 
Actual L gimbal 
' T = 0.08 I sec 
I 
I 
Tran;brnp;;;,nfor platform coordinates to required 
Steering 4- DAP 
Transformation of gimbal e r r o r s  to body coordinates 
Gimbal 
command 
. 0.08 I e r r o r  ! sec T =0.08 / 
I L Actual 
gimbal I Steering DAP - 
I Platform to gimbal 
Gimbal to body 
Figure 3. - Original guidance and control Figure 4. - Alternate guidance and control 
interface. interface (ramp steering). 
The first interface mechanization performed a simple digital integration of the 
guidance-rate command (fig. 3) to form a vehicle-attitude command. This integration 
caused step changes in the attitude command during each guidance- computation period 
(2.0 seconds), and these changes caused significant interaction with propellant-slosh 
dynamics. 
The next approach was to smooth the attitude commands by performing the inte- 
gration at the DAP sample rate (fig. 4). This change was effective in reducing the slosh 
excitation, but some concern a rose  about the fact that gimbal-angle e r r o r s  were being 
subjected to a coordinate transformation. This transformation of incremental attitude 
e r r o r s  cas t  some doubt on large-signal stability. Subsequently, the coordinate- 
transformation problem was solved, a s  shown in figure 5, by transforming guidance-rate 
command to body coordinates where the command is compared with a derived body ra te  
before the integration to produce body-attitude e r ro r .  
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Figure 5. - Final guidance and control 
interface (rate steering). 
Initialization. - No specific aspect of 
the CSM DAP initialization caused any hard- 
ships that would be classed as a problem, but 
enough minor changes were implemented in 
this area that the subject is worthy of men- 
tion. In the software system, just as in the 
case of hardware systems, the engineering 
attention required of the interface between 
two components may sometimes exceed the 
attention required fo r  the selection or de- 
sign of the components. Therefore, much 
of the software associated with the digital 
autopilots performed the following functions. 
1. Permitted crew selection of oper- 
ating mode 
2. Permitted crew selection of 
reaction-jet quads (e. g., jet  quads to use  
fo r  roll control) 
3. Permitted crew selection of 
maneuvering rate 
4. Permitted crew selection of attitude dead bands 
5. Permitted crew monitoring of m a s s  and engine-trim initialization 
6. Permitted crew change of mass  and engine-trim initialization i f  not satisfied 
with quantities in the computer 
7. Computed control effectiveness based upon stored functions of vehicle m a s s  
properties, mass-properties initialization data, and the available information on which 
reaction-jet motors can be used 
8. Permitted integration of the DAP into a complete maneuver program 
9. Provided computer restart protection 
Items 1 to 6 correspond closely with the proper configuration of several  switches 
on a control panel in the cockpit of a conventional aircraft, with the following exception. 
The flight control systems of aircraft (and previous spacecraft) seldom underwent the 
complete metamorphosis required of the Apollo CSM DAP f o r  (1) coasting-flight control 
of the Saturn IVB using Saturn IVB thrusters,  (2) coasting-flight control of the CSM, 
(3) powered-flight control of the CSM, (4) coasting-flight control of the CSM/LM, 
(5) powered-flight control of the CSM/LM, and (6) entry of the CM. This problem was 
solved through t h e  use of a special software routine designated R03. Verb 48 would 
call this routine, which would successively cycle through nouns 46, 47, and 48, each 
displaying either coded octal numbers that represented switch settings o r  decimal num- 
be r s  that represented CSM mass, LM mass,  o r  SPS-engine-gimbal pitch- and yaw-trim 
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settings. A s  these numbers were displayed, they could be changed simply by punching 
new numbers into the keyboard before proceeding to the next noun. 
Knowledge of the vehicle mass  (item 7) was necessary because the vehicle mass  
was used to compute vehicle inertia and control effectiveness. The Apollo digital auto- 
pilots successfully used knowledge of the expected vehicle response to a control action 
to provide valuable lead information. 
Item 8 on the list of peripheral software entails an  external program automatical- 
ly configuring the DAP to select the proper operating mode and to provide the necessary 
initialization data and the cor rec t  sequence of commands. Fo r  example, the SPS 
thrusting program (P40) tasks  that affected DAP operations included (1) performance of 
SPS engine gimbaling check, (2) selection of coasting-flight autopilot with narrow-dead- 
band attitude hold as engine ignition t ime approaches, (3) initiation of ullage, (4) com- 
mand of SPS thrust-ony (5) termination of ullage, (6) switch from reaction-jet control 
to TVC, (7) termination of thrust, and (8) reconfiguration of DAP from TVC to wide- 
dead-band reaction-jet control. 
One design change in the initialization process that was made late in the program 
should be discussed. Originally, the TVC DAP would initialize with zero-attitude 
e r r o r s ,  regardless  of the t rue  attitude at the time. In simulations, the disturbance 
torque during ullage was observed always to cause the attitude e r r o r  at thrust-on to be 
on the order  of 1 .0" .  The DAP initialization would wash out this information, and the 
initial thrusting directions would be in e r ro r .  
The guidance loop would eventually compensate if given sufficient time, but veloc- 
ity e r r o r s  would result for short-duration burns. The faster acting attitude-control 
loop would prevent these velocity e r r o r s  i f  the TVC DAP were to be initialized with the 
more cor rec t  attitude reference. A change was made to initialize the TVC DAP with 
the non-zero-attitude e r ro r s ,  if the configuration were CSM alone, at the expense of 
accepting an  initial engine-gimbaling and attitude transient. The engine-gimbaling 
transient was too severe for  the la rger  inertia configuration of the CSM/LM without a 
technique for  ramping the e r r o r  in slowly. Therefore, rather than risk an unnecessary 
software impact, the modification was made applicable to the one configuration only. 
Roll divergence. - During independent design-verification testing of off-nominal 
conditions, the roll attitude was discovered to  diverge in the presence of a failed-on 
roll thruster  during an  SPS velocity-change maneuver. This problem was caused by 
a combination of two separate design features. First ,  the t ime at which a new roll- 
control pulse could follow a roll of the same polarity was intentionally constrained to 
be grea te r  than one control sample period (0. 5 second). This constraint avoided the 
use  of a high-frequency pulse train of small pulses to hold attitude against a disturb- 
ance torque. The constraint worked quite well  for smaller  disturbances; but, in the 
presence of the large angular-acceleration disturbance that existed with a constant 
100-pound thrust  acting through a 7-fOOt lever  arm and acting on the small roll inertia 
(as small  as 1 5  000 slug-ft ), the attitude-error limit in the control law was too small 
to prevent divergence. 
2 
The mechanics of this phenomenon were as follows. Restoring torque thrusters  
would fire until the divergence rate was nulled, in addition to an  incremental amount of 
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thrust ontime proportional to attitude e r r o r .  During the forced delay, at which t ime the 
control torque could not be reapplied, the disturbance torque would add angular mo- 
mentum in the direction of divergence. If the restoring-control momentum impulse 
could have possibly continued to grow with the increasing attitude e r r o r ,  a steady-state 
limit-cycle condition would have been reached. Instead, the original design had a limit  
point beyond which the increasing attitude e r r o r  no longer affected the terminal res tor-  
ing momentum. Therefore, with a disturbance torque of sufficient magnitude to  null 
the terminal restoring momentum (i. e. ,  to rever t  to  zero-attitude rate) in less than 
half the jets-off delay, the attitude would diverge. This problem was solved by adding 
hysteresis to the phase-plane logic, so that restoring momentum would continue to 
grow with increasing attitude e r r o r ,  but the desirable feature of partially nulling large 
convergence rates w a s  retained. 
Command-service module RCS DAP rate-estimator gains. - Just  before the launch 
of the Apollo 7 mission, the CSM deorbit burn was discovered to be incurring a velocity 
e r r o r  as a result  of a n  initial thrusting e r r o r  caused by the TVC DAP attitude e r r o r  
initialization process. (The DAP ignored attitude e r r o r  existing at SPS thrust initia- 
tion. ) The four-jet ullage burn that preceded the SPS engine ignition in  these simula- 
tions produced approximately 200 ft-lb of disturbance torque about the negative pitch 
axis of the CSM vehicle at a t ime when the pitch inertia was lowest (SPS propellants 
near  depletion). The resulting disturbance acceleration would produce sufficient bias 
in the DAP estimated rate (with rate information being derived in a digital filter from 
noisy angular measurements) to degrade significantly the attitude-hold capability. The 
attitude dead band w a s  0 . 5 " ,  but the attitude e r r o r s  at ignition were on the o rde r  of 
1 . 2 "  . 
because slightly higher disturbance torques would have caused attitude divergence. 
This problem w a s  solved by using a two-jet ullage fo r  the Apollo 7 deorbit ullage 
maneuver and by raising the gains in the rate-estimation filter to reduce the rate bias 
resulting from a given acceleration disturbance. 
- 
An investigation showed that an insufficient margin at this flight condition existed 
Command-service module DAP/hand-controller interface. - Another significant 
design change that was implemented in the CSM coasting-flight autopilot involved the 
switching logic used in response to rotational hand controller (RHC) motions. The only 
information available to the CMC regarding hand-controller status is 6 bits of an input 
channel such that proportional rate control (vehicle-rate command proportional to 
amount of hand-controller deflection) was not possible. 
The original design simply f i red jets to null a rate e r r o r ,  defined by the differ- 
ence between the estimated vehicle rate and a preselected maneuver rate, until the 
rate e r r o r  was less than a small value. This small  value was computed as a function 
of vehicle inertia, but the value corresponded closely with the vehicle rate-change that 
would be expected for a minimum impulse of control torque. 
The disadvantages of this design were twofold. First, f o r  control about a light 
inertia axis, where the minimum impulse rate could be nearly as large as the lowest 
desired maneuver rate (0.05 deg/sec), performance was unacceptable; second, unnec- 
essary time delays and design complexity were involved in using a different switching 
logic when the hand controller was out of detent. The solution was to form the rate 
e r r o r  as before, integrate the rate e r r o r s  t o  f o r m  a n  attitude e r r o r ,  and then use  the 
attitude and ra te  e r r o r s  in the same phase-plane switching logic that was used for  
attitude-hold and automatic maneuvers. 
18 
Entry. - The CM DAP used during the final phase of the Apollo missions was rel- 
atively uncomplicated and trouble-free. The CM was aerodynamically stable in pitch 
and yaw deviations from the stability axes, and because the guidance scheme did not 
require alteration of the t r i m  angle of attack, only the rate damping needed to be pro- 
vided about these axes. The guidance scheme commanded rotations about the velocity 
vector, and because of the low guidance gains, guidance-commanded maneuvers were 
infrequent. 
were not critical. 
This lack of maneuvers implies that the roll attitude-control requirements 
This statement does not imply that the entry DAP design was trivial. The design 
did have several  modes and interfaced with several external programs. This particula 
DAP, like 'most of the others, was developed independently by separate designers. As 
such, the entry DAP provides another independent data point on a special-purpose dig- 
ital control system that was used on the Apollo Program and that did the job well. 
One aspect of the entry DAP development emphasizes the need for  close scrutiny 
of simulator models. The amount of reaction-control propellant consumed during entry 
of the Apollo 7 CM was observed to be approximately 50 percent higher than predicted. 
This overconsumption was later shown to be the result  of an insufficient atmospheric 
model in the simulator environment. Inclusion of a realistic wind profile in the simu- 
lator produced results that more closely matched the flight data. 
LUNAR MODULE DIG ITAL AUTOP I LOT DEVELOPMENT 
The LM DAP provides stabilization and control of the LM during both coasting 
and powered flight in three configurations - descent, ascent, and docked with the CSM. 
During the preliminary spacecraft-design phase, many fundamental decisions were 
made that impacted the control-system design. F o r  the LM, three basic propulsion- 
force and torque systems were established - RCS, descent propulsion system (DPS), 
and ascent propulsion system (APS). Characteristics that influenced the control task 
included the type of actuation system, the geometrical location and number of thrusters  
o r  jets, and the type of thrust-variation system. 
During DPS-powered flight, the LM DAP design provides yaw control with the 
RCS je t s  and pitch/roll attitude control with a combination of the RCS and the gimbal- 
t r i m  system (GTS). The geometrical location of the RCS jets is significant in establish- 
ing the fundamental design approach. 
During APS-powered flight, the primary purpose of the RCS is to provide attitude 
stabilization and control. However, whenever feasible, a design requirement exists to 
fire only the upward-thrusting RCS jets so that velocity changes from the main engine 
are augmented. Because the APS is a nongimbaled, fixed-throttle system, the RCS 
control laws associated with this mode must accommodate large time-variant disturb- 
ance torques. 
The RCS provides automatic or  manual rotation and small translation control for 
all LM configurations during coasting flight. For coasting flight, the design problem is 
characterized by the presence of low-disturbance torques (except for  a n  RCS jet-on fail- 
ure). The LM DAP was also required to control the entire Apollo spacecraft with the 
LM docked to the CSM, while performing a velocity-change maneuver using the LM DPS. 
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Vehic le  Design Const ra in ts  
Numerous constraints influenced the LM DAP design, the most predominant 
class of which related to weight restrictions associated with the lunar landing program. 
Weight considerations constrained the system design through (1) structural characteris-  
t i cs  of the LM/CSM - that is, structural-bending modes are significant; (2) propellant- 
sloshing dynamics - that is, slosh baffles were removed early in the program; and 
(3) unbalanced couple control - that is, requirements were established for  APS- 
powered flight. 
Another c lass  of constraints, generally identified late in the design-development 
phase, involved restrictions on RCS-jet firing. These restrictions included (1) duty- 
cycle constraints - propulsion instabilities; (2) exhaust-contamination constraints - 
particles on windows o r  optics; and (3) thermal constraints - RCS-exhaust-plume 
impingement heating. 
A third class  of constraints that influenced the design problem was associated 
with propulsion-system characteristics. The slow- speed characteristic of the DPS 
trim-gimbal actuator was established for  crew safety to avoid hardover actuator fail- 
u r e s  during powered descent of the LM. A special gear  drive was developed to restrict 
the trim-gimbal-drive ra te  of +O. 2 deg/sec. Unlike the classical actuator used fo r  the 
CSM TVC system, the DPS actuator cannot fail at a higher drive rate. A second 
propulsion- system constraint was associated with the decision to have a nongimbaled 
APS engine. This decision imposed significant l imits on the allowable center-of-mass 
characteristics during powered ascent flight. Unfortunately, effective control of the 
m a s s  center of gravity is difficult in a program such as Apollo. Another propulsion- 
system constraint was associated with the decision to locate the RCS j e t s  45"  f rom the 
body axes. This geometry significantly influenced the interaction between the RCS mode 
(control axes) and the GTS mode (body axes) during DPS-powered flight. 
The fourth class  of constraints that impacted the design problem included 
computer-oriented restrictions. The LM guidance computer (LGC) is limited in both 
fixed and erasable memories; in addition, definite timing restrictions are placed upon 
the programs required to provide the control functions. 
Design Philosophy 
An important question with respect to design philosophy was how to use  the inher- 
ent flexibility associated with a spacecraft  digital computer. This question was signifi- 
cant because the LM DAP represented a first-generation DAP design development. 
Emphasis was placed upon using digital capabilities such as logic (switching and branch- 
ing), nonlinear computations, and function generation. 
The concept of performance margin was an area of design philosophy that influ- 
enced DAP development. This concept emphasized the principle that the acceptability 
of the design should be based upon performance of the system during extreme, but re- 
quired, degraded conditions. Acceptable performance during off-nominal conditions, 
such as single undetected jet failures and l a rge  control-effectiveness uncertainties 
(thrust magnitude, inertia properties, thrust  misalinement, actuator drive rates, etc. ), 
was difficult to achieve. The performance-margin concept identified a general trade-off 
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between lowering the requirements for nominal system performance to achieve accept- 
able performance during degraded conditions, .while maintaining the highest possible 
measure of nominal performance. 
The philosophy of providing system-design flexibility to accommodate develop- 
mental problems or  future contingencies was related to the concept of performance 
margin. An example was the guideline to stabilize the GTS control loop independently 
of the RCS control loop. Three years  after this design w a s  initiated, additional thermal 
constraints (which essentially restricted all X-axis RCS-jet firings) were identified for 
the LM/CSM configuration during DPS-powered flight. The design was flexible enough 
to accommodate this restriction without significantly affecting the Apollo Program. 
The final design philosophy for LM DAP development was associated with the RCS 
propellant performance requirements. Design emphasis for the achievement of effi- 
cient propellant usage should be placed upon those control functions that require the 
largest  percentage of the entire propellant budget over a complete mission profile. For 
the LM DAP, these control functions included manual translations, manual and auto- 
matic attitude maneuvers, and maneuvers associated with powered-flight guidance. In 
accordance with this philosophy, the importance of efficient RCS propellant performance 
for  coasting-flight attitude control could be downgraded. Therefore, it could be asked 
why the design complexity and associated verification cost should be increased to save 
20 percent of the performance on an  i tem that uses 5 percent of the total mission pro- 
pellant. A definite trade-off exists between design complexity and performance- 
improvement payoff. 
Design Descr ipt ion 
The baseline LM DAP design that was initially flight-tested on the manned 
Apollo 9 mission is partially described to provide a background for a discussion on de- 
velopmental problems. Pr imary  emphasis is given to reviewing the design of the DPS- 
powered-flight mode. This mode is more complicated than the coasting-flight modes 
and provides significant insight into the design principles. 
A block diagram of the DPS-powered-flight automatic control is given in figure 6. 
The major design elements include a G&N outer loop, a mass-properties and control- 
law parameter  routine, an attitude state estimator, RCS control laws, jet-selection 
logic, and trim-gimbal control laws. A timing-and-control-logic interaction between 
the RCS control and the GTS control is also required. 
The integrated G&N outer loop interfaces with the LM DAP through a steering 
routine. A description of the attitude variables, which the steering routine inputs to 
the control system, is given in reference 4. 
The basic  input/output diagram f o r  the attitude state estimator is presented as 
figure 7. The direct  measurements available to the recursive state estimator are the 
three  gimbal angles. The estimator predicts angular attitude, velocity, and bias accel- 
eration. Nonlinear threshold logic is used to reject low-level measurement noise. 
Angular-acceleration information caused by RCS-jet firings and trim-gimbal activity is 
an  additional set of inputs to the state estimator. 
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the state estimator. 
The RCS control laws compute the re- 
quirements for rotational impulses by using 
information based upon attitude phase-plane 
e r r o r s ,  control effectiveness, and phase- 
plane targeting logic. These control laws 
are predictive in nature and are related to 
the classical two-point boundary value prob- 
lem.  To some extent, th i s  predictive design 
is inherently sensitive to the uncertainties 
in  control effectiveness and unmodeled dis- 
turbanc e s . Angular - e r  ro r / e r  ro r - rate phase 
planes a r e  used to establish jet-firing dura- 
tions in each control axis. The attitude and 
rate e r r o r s  a r e  used to establish the esti- 
mated state location in the phase plane. The 
acceleration inputs required by the RCS con- 
t rol  laws include net angular acceleration 
(jet acceleration plus offset acceleration) 
and coasting acceleration (acceleration 
caused by offset alone). The basic shape of 
the target parabolas and switching-line 
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parabolas are set by this angular-acceleration information. Additional logic estab - 
lishes the intersection of these parabolas with E = 0, based upon crew-selected dead 
band and the magnitude of the disturbance acceleration. 
The phase-plane configuration for the DPS-powered-flight mode is given in fig- 
u r e  8. The control logic is developed by (1) dividing the phase plane into coasting and 
firing zones, and (2) computing jet-firing durations for  each zone to accomplish a de- 
s i red  control action (i. e . ,  null rates, drive-to-target parabolas, and command mini- 
mum impulse). 
The jet-selection logic combines the required rotational impulses with the com- 
manded translation inputs and selects appropriate je ts  for control action. Additional 
information used by the jet-selection logic includes the desired number of jets to be 
fired and the identification of disabled jets. A normal jet-selection policy in the three 
translational and three rotational axes applies f o r  nominal conditions. When a required 
jet has been disabled, an alternate jet-selection policy is used. However, if multiple 
jet failures for  a given control axis have occurred, a computer-program a la rm is 
lighted and an a la rm code informs the astronauts that a rotational translation failure 
exists. 
Target parabola 
Zone 5 
Target parabola 
Zone 1 
Figure 8. - The phase plane when the LM is in powered ascent or  when 
either of the trim-gimbal-nulling drive t imes is greater  than 2 sec- 
onds during powered descent. 
E 
-t 
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Two slow-speed actuators a r e  used to gimbal the descent engine. The control 
modes developed f o r  commanding these t r im  actuators are an attitude-control mode 
and an  acceleration-nulling mode. 
The GTS control law associated with the attitude-control mode has been developed 
to be a function of e r r o r s  in attitude, rate, and acceleration. The control-law equations 
a r e  basically a modification of a time-optimal solution. The control output commands 
the sign of the change in angular acceleration. 
The GTS control law associated with the acceleration-nulling mode is designed to 
regulate the offset (disturbance) acceleration from the descent thrust. The pr imary 
dynamic environment that causes the disturbance acceleration to change is a shifting 
center of mass  as a result of propellant depletion, DPS-engine-mount compliance, and 
DPS-engine ablation effects. This control law is structured in the form of a t r im-  
gimbal drive-time equation. 
Design Evolution 
The history of the LM DAP development will be presented by discussing the 
design-formulation phase (September 1964 to December 1966), and the SUNBURST 
flight program phase (December 1966 to August 1967). Where applicable, comparisons 
will be made to the SUNDANCE baseline design previously discussed. The significant 
problems encountered will a l so  be discussed. 
Apollo 5, the first (unmanned) LM mission, was  launched into ear th  orbit Janu- 
ary 22, 1968, and used the SUNBURST flight program. After this mission, a decision 
w a s  made to simplify the DAP logic, and a significant redesign of the control system 
w a s  begun, resulting in the SUNDANCE digital program. This design version w a s  
flight-tested on the first manned LM mission (Apollo 9), launched March 3, 1969. Sub- 
sequent lunar orbital and lunar landing missions (Apollo 1 0  and 11) were flown with 
slightly modified SUNDANCE digital autopilots in the LUMINARY flight program series.  
SUNBURST DAP. - Many modifications in design philosophy and in control-system 
implementation occurred during the design-formulation phase of the LM DAP develop- 
ment. This early development culminated in the design that was incorporated into the 
first LM digital flight program (SUNBURST). Much of the material presented is given 
a more detailed treatment in reference 4, which provides descriptions of the designs 
that evolved to solve the developmental problems. 
Most of the significant problems associated with the preliminary design were 
identified as a result of extensive simulation testing. The problem of estimating ra te  
and acceleration when undetected jet  failures existed during powered descent proved 
difficult. Consideration was given to the use  of Kalman f i l t e r s  to estimate (from space- 
craft  dynamics) which of the 16 jets had failed and to adjust the control functions ac- 
cordingly. A second approach (subsequently implemented) was to use  the Kalman f i l ter  
equations only when the GTS control law was operative o r  when the RCS jets were inhib- 
ited. However, disabling control during powered flight f o r  the t ime needed to obtain a 
good filter estimation was  considered unacceptable, and this technique was discarded. 
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A second problem was that convergence to minimum-impulse attitude limit-cycle 
operation was not achieved by using the initial design. Design-verification studies in- 
dicated that this problem was caused by rate-estimation inaccuracies and quantization 
effects. The phase-plane logic was then modified to improve the performance 
characteristics. 
Significant design problems were identified with respect to the Kalman fi l ter  per- 
formance. In simulation testing, this estimator was shown to be sensitive to slosh dis- 
turbances and large initial conditions. Furthermore, during the DPS start transient, 
the filter performance exhibited poor convergence because of engine-mount compliance, 
propellant shift, and initial engine mistr im conditions. 
Rate-overshoot performance w a s  indicated to be a problem during coasting-flight 
maneuvers. The command-maneuver logic did not account for the finite t ime required 
to accelerate o r  decelerate to the desired maneuver rate, and additional jet  firings re- 
sulted. To solve this problem, lag angles were provided to prevent overshoot when 
initiating o r  terminating an automatic maneuver. 
The original LM DAP design attempted to incorporate information from the 
guidance-commanded DPS thrust into the logic fo r  switching control f rom the GTS to 
reaction-jet control. This incorporation was thought to be necessary because the dis- 
turbance acceleration would be changed, with a change in throttle setting, because of 
the change in thrust-force magnitude as well as  a thrust-vector rotation resulting from 
engine-mount compliance. Therefore, a logic was configured whereby a sensed throttle 
change of more than 5 percent of full thrust would force mandatory use of reaction-jet 
control until throttle activity subsided. Simulation testing showed that e r r o r s  in com- 
puter knowledge of actual vehicle mass  could prevent return to trim-gimbal control. 
This design discrepancy was resolved for the la ter  flight programs by relinquishing the 
objective of providing the estimation fi l ter  and control-mode logic with lead information 
f rom the throttle commands. 
The performance of the LM control system during the DPS-start-transient period 
was of sufficient concern to require design modifications of the SUNBURST flight pro- 
g ram before the Apollo 5 mission. The major problem was caused by e r r o r s  introduced 
in the open-loop drive-time equation and by the subsequent poor convergence f rom RCS 
control to GTS control. The effect of a drive-time e r r o r  is to maintain a residual off- 
set disturbance ,torque while the system is i n  the RCS mode. If this offset is large,  the 
RCS jets converge the attitude and rate e r ro r s  slowly to the region in which return to 
the GTS control is made. During this period, the jets must fire to combat the sustained 
offset  disturbance, and unnecessary reaction- jet propellant is consumed. 
Fac tors  that significantly contribute to the e r r o r  in open-loop drive t ime are as 
follows. 
1. Propellant shift during ullage and the low-throttling time period 
2. Actuator and engine-mount compliance 
3. Uncertainties in the assumed values of mass-property variables 
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4. E r r o r s  in estimate of offset acceleration caused by insufficient measurements, 
propellant-slosh dynamics, attitude-rate initial conditions, and measurements noise 
Simulation testing indicated that these factors could seriously degrade the per- 
formance of the control system during the DPS-start-transient period. Design modi- 
fications were made to improve the RCS and GTS logic interface and the quality of the 
estimate of offset acceleration. The interface logic provided significantly improved 
convergence characterist ics at the expense of permitting large attitude e r r o r s  during 
the transfer of control modes. An additional logic of ensurigg a minimum number of 
measurements for the Kalman filter was inserted because of the transient character- 
istic of the estimator. 
The following four additional design modifications were made to improve the DPS- 
start-transient performance: 
(2) the maximum open-loop drive t ime was limited to 1 5  seconds; (3) the GTS control 
(and Kalman filter estimates) were scheduled at specific t imes when operating in  the 
low-throttle region; and (4) the GTS attitude control law during the low-thrust-start- 
transient period was modified. 
(1) the Kalman filter weighting values were modified; 
In August 1967, a decision was made to  redesign the LM DAP. The objectives of 
the redesign were to reduce memory storage requirements, improve off-nominal per- 
formance, and reduce computer execution time. The four major changes that resulted 
included simplification of the jet-selection logic, simplification of the RCS control law 
logic, improvement in the GTS and RCS interface design, and development of an inte- 
grated state estimator design. This improved design was incorporated in the SUN- 
DANCE flight program. 
SUNDANCE and LUMINARY DAP. - Apollo 5, the first unmanned LM mission, 
was launched into earth orbit in January 1968 and used flight program SUNBURST 
(which included design corrections for  most of the preliminary design problems pre- 
viously discussed). Later a significant redesign was performed, which resulted in the 
SUNDANCE digital program. This design version was flight-tested on the first manned 
LM mission (Apollo 9). Subsequent lunar landing missions were flown with slightly 
modified SUNDANCE digital autopilots in the LUMINARY flight program series. The 
significant design problems that occurred during the SUNDANC E and LUMINARY devel- 
opmental phase will be reviewed in this section. 
Several structural-bending problems associated with the LM/CSM RCS were 
identified. The original design was unstable in bending because of (1) state-estimator 
t ime lags and (2) jet-firing logic that sometimes inhibited je t  commands for  whole 
sampling cycles. This dynamics problem was identified late in the design because 
simulation techniques were used exclusively to verify the stability characterist ics,  and 
an unfortunate simulator e r r o r  was made in the representation of the bending dynamics. 
These problems resulted in erroneous testing results.  This design and verification 
problem illustrates the necessity of performing stability analysis in addition to detailed 
simulation testing. Acceptable bending stability was obtained by decreasing the state- 
estimator gains and by increasing the attitude dead band. 
A structural-loading problem was identified when the LM/CSM vehicle was sub- 
jected t o  an RCS- jet failure condition. Significant unmodeled disturbance torques (such 
as a jet  failed "on" that was not detected) caused the vehicle to limit-cycle on one side 
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of the control law phase plane. Simulations were obtained in which the control-jet 
pulsing frequency was  close to the natural frequency of the bending mode. Test  results 
indicated conditions in which acceptable structural load limits were exceeded. In many 
cases, large oscillations were sustained even after the disturbance torque excitation 
was removed. A design modification was made to reduce the control torque energy in 
the frequency spectrum of the first structural-bending mode. This reduction was  ac- 
complished by inhibiting jet firings about a given axis for a time interval after the pre- 
vious firing for  that axis. 
An interesting design problem occurred in the a r e a  of inertial cross-coupling 
effects during ascent powered flight. With the jet-firing calculations established in the 
control (U/V) axis system, an RCS torque applied around the U-axis produces not only 
an acceleration around the desired U-axis, but also, in general, a coupled acceleration 
about the V-axis. The same situation applies to an RCS torque applied around the 
V-axis. The simplified equations of motion that demonstrate the effect of inertial 
c r o s s  coupling are as follows. 
where h = angular velocity, rad/sec 
M , M = control torques available, ft-lb 
I I = principal moments of inertia, lb-sec2-ft 
u v  
YY' zz 
The off-diagonal t e rms  represent coupling between control axes that was  sufficient to 
cause undesirable limit-cycle performance during powered ascent. 
A design modification was made to eliminate the inertial cross-coupling effects. 
A nonorthogonal set of control axes (Ut, V') was defined that had the property that a 
pure U-torque produces no observable acceleration in  the V'-direction, and a pure 
V-torque produces no observable acceleration in the UT-direction. This solution in- 
volved the computation of incremental angles through which the control axes (U, V) 
should be offset to become the t rue direction of angular acceleration during application 
Of U-axis o r  V-axis torques. The control e r rors  were then transformed to the new con- 
t rol  axes  (Ut, Vt). These transformation angles were functions of the vehicle inertia 
and were periodically updated through mass-property computations. 
A guidance and control interaction problem was identified for  the terminal lunar 
landing mission phase. Large guidance and steering system time delays, together with 
a time-variant guidance loop gain, resulted in low-f requency attitude oscillations. The 
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t ime lags were caused by a 2-second delay inherent in the ramp-steering design concept 
and a computational time delay. Design modifications that were incorporated into the 
lunar landing mission programs included the implementation of lead compensation into 
the guidance loop and a decrease of the attitude dead band at small values of t ime to go. 
A computational scaling design problem occurred for the LM/CSM GTS control 
system. This gimbal control system would not t r im  at low thrust levels because of an 
underflow caused by a coding implementation. Testing indicated that the powered-flight 
start-transient performance was extremely sensitive to initial engine mistr ims.  A re- 
scale of the coding for the GTS control law to eliminate the underflow character is t ics  
resulted in an acceptable design. 
The final design problem to be discussed was in the a r e a  of sloshing stability dur- 
ing DPS-powered flight. Both simulation and flight tes t  data results have indicated that 
the LM/CSM and the LM configurations were sensitive to sloshing dynamics during 
powered flight. Detailed analyses have demonstrated that the GTS control law alone is 
unstable in slosh for certain conditions. However, in this situation, the total control 
system maintains stability because of the slosh-damping provided by the RCS control 
system. The performance penalty is primarily that of unnecessary jet firings. Fac- 
t o r s  that influence the GTS control system slosh stability a r e  (1) large t ime lags in the 
ra te  estimator because of the nonlinear threshold logic, (2) the acceleration estimate 
t e rm in the GTS control law that is filtered and does not provide effective control, and 
(3) large sampling lags that occur at the slosh frequencies with the GTS control law 
computed only five t imes pe r  second. 
FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
The CSM and LM flight results discussed will  include performance data from the 
manned and unmanned missions, and resu l t s  to satisfy detailed test  objectives (DTO's) 
established preflight. 
Typical flight data results are presented to indicate performance trends. The 
ability to match the preflight-simulation-test results closely with the actual flight data 
is dependent upon the quality of the telemetered data and upon the accuracy of the 
spacecraft environment that was modeled in  the simulator. In  general, powered-flight 
maneuvers and coasting-flight attitude maneuvers can be closely duplicated, but 
attitude-hold limit-cycle behavior is more  difficult to match in the postflight analytic 
process. 
Detailed test  objectives were established f o r  the LM and CSM digital autopilots; 
in general, these DTO's were scheduled during the ear ly  missions in  an  attempt to 
verify basic performance capabilities formally. Tables I1 and III summarize the DTO'S, 
descriptions, and results. Rather than being segregated on a mission basis, the DTO'S 
are grouped into CSM and LM tests.  
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TABLE 11. - SUMMARY OF CSM DAP DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES 
Title 
Guidance, navigation, 
and control system 
(GNCS) attitude 
control 
GNCS AV control 
GNCS entry 
Propellant slosh 
damping 
GNCS entry lunar 
return 
TVC DAP stability 
margin 
Description 
Set of 1 5  RCS DAP functional 
tests: attitude hold (2 dead 
bands), automatic maneuvers 
(4 rates), manual maneuvers 
(4 rates), minimum-impulse 
controller inputs, RCS trans- 
lations (3 axes), and RHC in- 
puts in free mode 
Evaluation of SPS burns for long- 
and short-burn velocity 
errors, engine mistrims, 
start transients, center of 
gravity, tracking, and slosh 
damping 
Evaluation of GNCS guidance for 
entry from earth orbit 
Obtaining data on propellant 
slosh damping after SPS and 
RCS burns for RCS fuel 
budgeting 
Performance of GNCS entry 
from a lunar return and evalu- 
ation of the entry monitor sub- 
system (EMS) monitoring 
capability 
Stroking test 
Remarks 
One 3.6" automatic trim maneuve 
was  recorded 
One maximum-dead-band attitude 
hold w a s  performed for less 
than 5 minutes 
The stabilization and control sys- 
tem (SCS) control w a s  used in 
all other RCS activity except 
four ullages 
One long SPS burn and five short 
burns were performed and all 
objectives were met 
Accurate guidance was achieved, 
and control was as expected 
except in the transonic region 
No unusual slosh amplitudes were 
noted 
Excellent agreement between G&I 
and EMS data was indicated 
Nominal G&N performance was 
achieved 
Successfully accomplished 
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TABLE IJI. - SUMMARY OF LM DAP DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES 
Title 
GNCS attitude stabilization 
and control during coast 
periods 
LM GNCS/DAP perform- 
ance and thrust 
performance 
GNCS attitude/translation 
control 
GNCS-controlled APS 
burn 
GNCS undocked DPS 
performance 
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Description 
Demonstration of RCS attitude 
stabilization using the GNCS 
for attitude reference 
Verification of simple attitude and 
translation commands and atti- 
tude hold at minimum and maxi- 
mum dead bands 
Performance of a medium-duration 
DPS firing to include manual 
throttling with CSM and LM 
docked and short-duration DPS 
burn with undocked LM 
Demonstration of RCS translation 
and attitude control of the staged 
LM using automatic and manual 
GNCS control 
Performance of a GNCS/DAP- 
controlled long-duration APS 
burn 
Flight test objective 1 - 
Evaluation of the capability of 
GNCS to execute DPS high- 
thrust undocked maneuver 
Objective verified 
Coasting-attitude hold 
(maximum dead band) 
Attitude maneuvers 
Translation commands 
Docked DPS burn 
Short DPS insertion burn 
Automatic -attitude 
maneuver 
Attitude hold of staged 
LM (maximum and 
minimum dead bands) 
Manual rotational and 
translational com- 
mands (staged LM) 
Automatic translation 
APS burn to depletion 
DPS phasing burn 
DO1 burn 
Flight test objective 2 - 
hraluation of the capability of 
GNCS to execute the descent 
orbit insertion (DOI) 
maneuver 
Command-service module TVC DAP performance data. - Apollo 7 w a s  the first 
manned Apollo flight to use  a DAP. This flight consisted of the Apollo CSM only. (A 
different digital f i l ter  is required when the LM is attached. ) The flight contained eight 
main engine burns. Five burns occurred under TVC DAP control for the entire burn, 
and a sixth occurred that was initiated by the primary control system, with a switch to 
a backup manual control mode after 35.8 seconds. Two burns were minimum-impulse 
burns, and three burns ranged between 7.8 and 10.9 seconds in duration. Thrust  mis- 
t r im  at the beginning of these burns was l e s s  than 0.2" in  all cases, and peak attitude 
e r r o r s  (except roll) were all less than 0.5" during DAP control. 
Peak 
pitch or  
yaw e r ro r ,  
Total 
AV, 
ft/sec deg 
24.8 0.4944 
3000.0 .4504 
134.8 .1634 
3520.0 .3955 
Tables IV to VI a r e  presented to summarize the significant flight tes t  results for 
the TVC DAP from the Apollo 8 to 10 missions, respectively. Data f rom the Apollo 7 
and 11 missions a r e  omitted because these flights were s imilar  to the Apollo 8 and 10 
missions, respectively . 
AV residuals before nulling, 
ft/sec 
' 
x 2 z 
4.4 -0.1 0.1 
-1.4 0 .2 
(4 (4 (4 
-. 5 . 4  -. 1 
The Apollo 8 lunar flight used essentially the same control systems that were 
used by the Apollo 7 mission with equally good results. The Apollo 8 mission provided 
additional flight experience, especially in the area of long-duration burns. Control- 
system dynamics interaction with guidance performance was insignificant for the CSM- 
only configuration. However, this interaction was not insignificant for  the CSM/LM 
configuration, as used on the Apollo 9 mission. 
' 
SPS 
burn 
1 
2 
3 
4 
The Apollo 9 mission was the main developmental flight for the TVC DAP design. 
The control-loop performance had been degraded to the point of potentially significant 
guidance and control interaction, primarily as a safety measure for this first CSM/LM- 
docked flight to guard against high-frequency instability. Also, an  inflight dynamics 
test had been designed to determine experimentally the frequency response of the air- 
f r ame  dynamically coupled to the SPS engine actuation system (ref. 5). This tes t  con- 
sisted of a special routine in  the CMC acting as a function generator t o  supply excitation 
to the SPS engine pitch command during powered flight. Telemetered response data 
Vehicle 
configuration 
CSM 
CSM 
CSM 
CSM 
TABLE IV. - APOLLO 8 FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
No data. a 
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TABLE V. - APOLLO 9 FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
"2 
ft/sec 
SPS 
burn 
Peak 
pitch o r  
yaw e r ro r ,  
deg 
Vehicle 
configuration 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
~~ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
CSM/LM 19.7 
CSM/LM 48.7 
CSM/LM 2982.4 
CSM/LM 138.9 
CSM 3630.3 
CSM/LM 
CSM/LM 
CSM/LM 
CSM/LM 
CSM/LM 
CSM 
CSM 
CSM 
.5 
.3 
.39 
.6 
-. 9 -. 1 
0 -. 2 
.5 -. 4 
.3 1.6 
36.8 
850.6 
2570.7 
299.1 
571.8 
38.8 
653.3 
321.4 
SPS 
burn 
0.48 
2. 31 
4. 36 
2.77 
7.21 
.41 
1.85 
1.35 
AV residuals before nulling, 
ft/sec 
x 
1.6 
0 
2.7 
.2 
1.9 
1.1 
-1.3 
7. 5 
0. 5 
1.0 
-2. 5 
3.9 
11.4 
-. 6 
1.0 
.63 
TABLE VI. - APOLLO 10 FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
Vehicle 
configuration 
Total 
AV, 
ft/sec 
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@ I  
Y 1 
-0.2 
.2 
-2.3 
2.7 
1.7 
-. 3 
-. 2 
-2.0 
AV residuals before nulling, 
pitch or  ft/sec 
yaw e r ro r ,  
0.5 1 1.0 I 0.3 1 0.7 
.3 
0 
. 4  
-. 1 
were then analyzed to determine the total plant transfer function response to verify the 
dynamic- stability margin and to provide confidence in the analytical mathematical 
models. The essential result of this test  was a n  experimental verification of the 
coupled-plant-transfer-function response in the flight environment in a frequency band 
encompassing the first two predominant structural resonances. The predicted ampli- 
tude ratios at the first two frequencies were -1.5 and -6.6 decibels, while those deter- 
mined from the flight data were -6. 0 and -12.0 decibels, respectively. 
The fifth SPS burn on Apollo 9 exhibited a serious deviation of the spacecraft atti- 
tude. Data for  this burn are shown in figure 9. The attitude e r r o r  w a s  quite large 
throughout the burn, peaking at just over 7 " .  Analysis of these data showed that this 
type of response was proper f o r  the TVC controller being used on this mission. The 
Yaw attitude error7 
I._ 
3 - 1 . 0 1  I I I I I I I I ' '  I ' I ' I I I 
m 0 2 4 6 8 10121416182022242628303234363840424446 
B u r n  time, sec 
Figure 9. - Apollo 9 yaw data 
fo r  SPS burn 5. 
main disturbance inputs were center-of- 
mass  motion (a je rk  disturbance) as well 
as a 0.2" initial thrust  misalinement (ac- 
celeration disturbance). In view of the fact 
that even la rger  initial thrust misalinements 
can occur, this performance is considered 
unacceptable. 
Table V provides performance data 
for the eight SPS burns that were conducted 
on the Apollo 9 mission, and these data are 
in  the form of peak attitude e r r o r s ,  peak 
body rates, and residual velocity e r r o r s  at 
the end of the burns. The velocity e r r o r  
at the end of SPS burn 5 was 11.4 ft/sec, 
demonstrating the severity of the control 
dynamics interacting with guidance 
performance. 
The uprated CSM/LM TVC DAP design had been accepted for  incorporation into 
the flight software that was used on the first lunar mission of the complete Apollo vehi- 
cle. As  a result, guidance performance was greatly improved. The Apollo 10 perform- 
ance is summarized in table VI. 
Detailed test objective results f o r  CSM. - A s  mentioned previously, a summary of 
the CSM DTO's is given in table II. In this section, the individual test objectives will 
be discussed in more detail. 
The purpose of the GNCS attitude control test was to verify the ability of the CSM 
RCS DAP to perform automatic- and manual-attitude maneuvers, to maintain attitude 
hold, and to control RCS translations. Unfortunately, nearly all RCS maneuvers were 
Performed in the SCS control mode, and the primary guidance, navigation, and control 
system maneuvers were not thoroughly tested on this mission. 
No manual-attitude rotational maneuvers were performed under computer control. 
One automatic-attitude maneuver was performed, but the initial conditions were too 
nearly ideal fo r  a valid test; four maneuver rates were called for  in the DTO. A 
maximum-dead-band attitude hold partially satisfied one test objective, but the 
minimum-dead-band test did not satisfy another objective. Four ullages were per- 
formed, which demonstrated a failure of the RCS DAP to maintain minimum dead 
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band during ullage. This problem had been observed in preflight simulations, and a 
correction was made that partially verified the ability of the RCS DAP to perform 
attitude control during translations. No indication was given in the postflight analy- 
sis of any RHC inputs while the spacecraft was in the CMC free mode. 
The objective of the GNCS delta-V control test was to verify the TVC DAP per- 
formance and guidance system accuracy during both long and short  SPS burns. Six 
GNCS-controlled burns were performed during the Apollo 7 mission, and all test objec- 
tives were achieved. The cross-axis velocity e r r o r s  for  short  burns were consistent 
with preflight simulation results and demonstrated that the primary cause of these ve- 
locity e r r o r s  w a s  the combination of poor RCS attitude hold and the failure to initialize 
the TVC DAP with the RCS e r r o r s  at the end of ullage. A TVC DAP change was imple- 
mented i n  the Apollo 11 spacecraft to correct  this initialization problem fo r  the 
undocked CSM configuration (no correction was made for  the CSM/LM-docked configu- 
ration). Two minimum-impulse burns were performed to demonstrate the ability of 
the TVC DAP to perform 0. 5-second burns. Significant and variable slosh effects were 
noted in both GNCS- and SCS-controlled burns. No bending was detected. Large actu- 
ator transients caused by engine gimbal compliance were noted, but no stability problem 
was evident. The center-of-gravity tracking function of the DAP was demonstrated 
during the long burn. Steering during both long and short  burns was shown to be con- 
sistent with simulation results. The ability to remove residual velocity e r r o r s  was 
demonstrated using the RCS jets. 
The purpose of the GNCS entry test  was to evaluate the ability of the GNCS to 
guide the CSM entry from earth orbit and to  provide adequate display-and-keyboard and 
flight-director-attitude-indicator displays. The entry maneuver was started in the SCS 
mode and w a s  switched to computer control using the entry DAP. Steering accuracy 
was demonstrated by a 3-mile splashdown e r r o r .  The DAP properly performed an 
over-the-top roll maneuver and limited the roll rate to the 20-deg/sec maximum. 
Aerodynamic effects were greater  than expected in the transonic region and caused in- 
creased jet firings and high RCS propellant consumption during the last 2 minutes of 
the entry phase. The offset e r r o r  between computer DAP rates and the rate gyroscope 
outputs was noted, but DAP performance was consistent with the computed values. 
The purpose of the propellant-slosh-damping test was to obtain data on propellant 
slosh damping after SPS cutoff and after RCS burns. The main objective was to  obtain 
data on the amount of RCS propellants that may be expended as a result  of residual 
kinetic energy in the SPS propellants at the end of an SPS engine burn. Describing the 
zero-g dynamics analytically proved to be a n  insurmountable task; therefore, the avail- 
ability of flight test data became desirable fo r  u se  in budgeting RCS propellants and in 
determining procedures for  initializing RCS attitude hold following main engine burns. 
Al l  the specific procedures called fo r  in the DTO were not performed; but reaction-jet 
activity was minimal after all eight SPS burns on the Apollo 7 mission, and no positive 
evidence of troublesome effects from zero-g propellant dynamics was found. 
The purpose of the GNCS-entry lunar-return test was to verify GNCS performance 
in controlling an entry at lunar-return conditions and to evaluate the EMS monitor capa- 
bility. The EMS load factor/velocity (G/V) trace agreed closely with the CMC- 
computed trace. The commander reported that the EMS range-to-go counter agreed 
with the G/V trace when the 50-nautical-mile line was crossed. Steering and DAP con- 
trol  during the automatic entry were nominal. 
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The attitude control of CSM/LM configuration in  powered-flight test  consisted 
primarily of the stroking test  that was discussed in the previous section of this report. 
A complete description of the stroking test and the details of the postflight analysis a r e  
documented in reference 5. 
Lunar module DAP performance data. - The LM flight performance results dis- 
cussed include test  data f rom the unmanned Apollo 5 mission and the manned Apollo 9, 
10, and 11 missions. 
Only the DAP coasting-flight modes were exercised in  the Apollo 5 flight. Flight 
data for  an  automatic 5-deg/sec attitude maneuver showed close agreement with simula- 
tion data. The Apollo 5 mission provided some unplanned limit-cycle data during 
coasting ascent because of a mass-mismatch condition. This  situation a rose  because, 
although the spacecraft was actually in  an  ascent configuration, the DAP computed the 
vehicle inertia to be that of the unstaged LM. A s  a consequence of the 300-percent- 
inertia mismatch condition, a virtually continuous firing limit cycle resulted, but the 
narrow-dead-band attitude-hold logic did maintain the desired attitude. After this oper- 
ation, one RCS propellant system w a s  allowed to f i r e  to depletion, and data were taken 
at various lower thrust levels as the propellant was being depleted. Almost immediate- 
ly, the limit-cycle character is t ics  began to improve, and eventually the attitude-hold 
function settled into a minimum-impulse condition. This condition implied that the DAP 
performed properly when its estimate of control effectiveness was normal. 
Limit-cycle data were also analyzed during the descent coast phase of the Apollo 5 
mission. Unexplained limit-cycle trajectories in  both pitch and roll phase planes, 
which were  asymmetrical  in  computed e r r o r  rate and symmetrical in attitude e r r o r ,  
were observed. During a 2-hour period, 125 jet firings occurred, approximately 30 of 
which had durations of f rom 50 to 110 milliseconds. Preflight verification testing indi- 
cated that 16-millisecond (minimum-impulse) firings should occur at the dead-band 
extremities. An extended effort was made to match the flight test through simulation 
testing. Inertia coupling, aerodynamic torques, and diagonal firing logic were all ex- 
amined, but the observed limit-cycle phenomenon was only partially explained. The 
effect of these fir ings on total RCS propellant consumed for  attitude control was 
negligible . 
The Apollo 9 mission, during which the LM was manned for the first time, was 
flown in ear th  orbit. Al l  powered- and coasting-flight DAP modes were exercised dur- 
ing the mission, and the control- system performance w a s  generally excellent. No 
anomalous o r  unexpected control- system conditions occurred. Data examined in  the 
postflight analysis included peak-to-peak rates, attitude-dead-band excursions, general 
limit-cycle character is t ics  (including existence of disturbance torques), and t r im-  
gimbal performance. A phase-plane plot of the limit-cycle performance during a 
powered-ascent firing is presented in figure 10. The intent of the plot is to t race  the 
shape of the limit-cycle trajectory. 
discrete  data points in the phase plane were available. The plot does indicate on a 
qualitative basis  that the results were within a range consistent with preflight simula- 
tion results.  
Because of the data-sampling limitations, only 
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Figure 10. - Ascent propulsion system 
burn to depletion, U-axis phase 
plane. 
A summary of the Apollo 9 perform- 
ance flight test results is as follows. 
1. Descent configuration 
a. The automatic attitude-hold 
function before the DPS insertion burn was 
verified as nominal. 
b. Residual velocities for  the 
translational burns were acceptable. 
2. Ascent configuration 
a. The automatic attitude-hold 
function was nominal. 
b. Automatic maneuvers appeared 
nominal. 
c. The APS burn-to-depletion 
performance was acceptable. 
The Apollo 9 powered-flight burn residuals 
are presented in table VII. 
TABLE VII. - APOLLO 9 LM FLIGHT BURN RESIDUALS 
Docked DPS 
Insertion 
Coelliptic 
insertion 
1745.0 
90. 7 
39 .9  
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The Apollo 10 and 11 manned missions were lunar orbital and lunar landing 
missions, respectively. The LM control- system performance during those operational 
missions was generally excellent. No anomalous o r  unexpected control- system condi- 
tions were observed. A summary of the Apollo 10 performance flight test resul ts  is 
as follows. 
Desired AV, 
ft/sec Burn 
DO1 71.2 
Phasing 176.9 
Insertion 220.9 
1. Descent configuration 
Components of residual velocity, 
ft/sec 
x ir z 
-0.1 -0.3 -0. 5 
. 2  -. 5 -. 9 
-1.5 0. 3 -1.2 
a. The automatic attitude-hold function before the DO1 was verified as 
nominal. 
b. The automatic maneuver at 2 deg/sec to the DO1 burn attitude appeared 
nominal. 
c. Residual velocities following the DO1 and DPS phasing burns were 
acceptable. 
d. The maximum spacecraft ra te  during the phasing burn was 1.2 deg/sec 
and attitude-error dead band was maintained satisfactorily. 
2. Ascent configuration 
a. The automatic attitude-hold function was nominal. 
b. Automatic maneuvers were performed nominally. 
c. The APS insertion burn performed nominally. 
d. The maximum rate during the APS insertion burn was 2. 5 deg/sec. 
e. The transfer-phase initiation burn appeared nominal. 
The Apollo 10 powered-flight burn residuals a r e  presented in table VIII. 
TABLE VIII. - APOLLO 10 LM FLIGHT BURN RESIDUALS 
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A summary of the Apollo 11 performance flight test results is as follows. 
1. Descent configuration 
a. The DO1 burn delta-V residuals appeared nominal. 
b. Attitude transients, because of the powered descent initiation, were 
nominal and quickly damped. 
c. Slosh oscillations were apparent 233 seconds into the burn and caused 
peak-to-peak amplitudes of 3. 0 deg/sec. 
d. Powered descent required 88 pounds of RCS propellant compared with a 
budget of 40 pounds. The majority (66 pounds) was expended during periods of manual 
control because of terrain avoidance near touchdown. 
2. Ascent configuration 
a. Al l  ascent control functions appeared nominal. 
b. The RCS translation burns were nominal. 
Lunar module DTO results. - A summary of the LM DTO's is given in table 111. 
In this section, the individual test  objectives will be discussed in more detail. 
The objective of the GNCS attitude stabilization and control test was to demon- 
strate attitude stabilization at various inertia configurations using the RCS. This 
demonstration would include commanding simple attitude and translation commands in 
all axes in addition to maintaining attitude hold at minimum and maximum dead bands. 
The jet-selection logic and the T calculations were verified for  coasting- jet 
flight attitude-hold periods by use of the available down-link data. The LGC-estimated 
rates, the IMU gimbal angles, and desired gimbal angles were used to construct phase 
planes that were used in the investigations. The attitude-hold capability was verified 
only for  the maximum dead band because no data were available for  periods of 
minimum-dead- band attitude hold. On subsequent missions, the attitude-hold capability 
fo r  periods of minimum dead band was evaluated. 
Two automatic-attitude maneuvers were investigated and found to be satisfactory. 
Both of the maneuvers were performed at approximately the prescribed angular rates 
of 5 deg/sec, and the attitude e r r o r s  during these maneuvers were within f 1 of 
the prescribed dead band. The angular rates were  determined from three sources: 
the LGC-estimated rates, the rate gyroscope outputs, and a matrix operation that per- 
mits a finite difference technique of the gimbal transformed to body coordinates. The 
agreement in  rates obtained from all three sources  appeared reasonable. 
The RCS capability of maintaining attitude hold during translation commands was 
verified only for an X-axis translation. The RCS did maintain the appropriate dead 
bands during the periods investigated. The translation capability of the RCS was veri- 
fied for  the other axes on subsequent missions. 
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The objectives of the LM GNCS/DAP performance and thrust-performance test 
were to perform a medium-duration DPS firing to include manual throttling with CSM 
and LM docked and a short-duration DPS firing with an  undocked LM and approximately 
half-full DPS propellant tanks. An LM/CSM-docked DPS burn was performed during the 
Apollo 9 mission, where the throttle profile as specified in the DTO was used. The 
manual-throttle profile used during the latter portion of the burn verified the variable 
thrust ability of the DPS engine. Satisfactory DPS engine response to thrust commands 
was  obtained. The RCS for this burn was turned off, and attitude control was main- 
tained solely by the GTS. Peak angular ra tes  following the throttleup to the fixed 
throttle position were quite low (0.14 deg/sec about the pilot pitch (Q) axis and 0.2 deg/ 
sec  about the pilot roll (R) axis). Angular ra tes  and attitude excursions obtained dur- 
ing the steady-state portion of the burn were low. The peak angular rates that occurred 
during the throttling profile near the end of the burn were -0.35 deg/sec for  the Q-axis 
and 0.53 deg/sec for the R-axis. The steady-state position of the DPS engine agreed 
with the predicted position when compliance was taken into consideration. Slosh was 
evident during the burn and the magnitude and frequency of the oscillations agreed with 
predicted values. Velocity e r r o r s  at cutoff were reasonable. 
A short-duration DPS firing with an undocked LM and approximately half-full 
DPS propellant tanks was also performed. The peak attitude e r r o r s  about the U and V 
control axes  were less than 1.7" .  The peak angular rates about these two axes were 
1.18 and -0.67 deg/sec, respectively. The dead band for the insertion burn was lo, 
and the RCS in combination with the GTS performed well in maintaining this dead band. 
The GTS did t r im  the descent engine to the expected value. The slosh that was evident 
during the burn was anticipated, and the velocity residuals were nominal. 
The objective of the GNCS attitude/translation control test  was  to demonstrate 
RCS translation and attitude control of the staged LM using automatic and manual GNCS 
control. An automatic maneuver was  performed at 2 deg/sec with command rates 
about the Q- and R-axes. A review of the down-link rates, CDU angles, desired rates, 
and final desired CDU angles verified that the overall performance was satisfactory. 
The desired r a t e s  were obtained, and the final CDU angles indicated that the automatic 
maneuver provided the appropriate vehicle rotation. The vehicle configuration was the 
staged LM (heavy ascent). 
The attitude-hold capability for the ascent configuration was verified for a period 
of t ime immediately after the APS burn to depletion. During this period, the dead band 
started out at 5" and then was automatically switched to 0.3'. The DAP functioned 
properly, and the transition f rom maximum to minimum dead band was smooth. The 
configuration was the light- staged LM . 
Eight minutes of flight data were analyzed during a period just before docking. 
The DAP w a s  in a 0.3' dead-band attitude-hold mode (staged LM, heavy ascent), but a 
profusion of manual RHC and thrust/translation controller assembly (TTCA) activity 
occurred at this time. Rates induced by RHC activity were as high as 2 deg/sec, and 
the DAP was nulling the ra tes  and maintaining a 0.3" attitude dead band after the 
release of the RHC. Attitude e r r o r s  induced by TTCA activity were also nulled at the 
completion of the activity. 
during the coelliptic- sequence-initiation burn and immediately after the burn. The 
burn itself was a four-jet positive-X translation. The DAP was verified to hold the 
appropriate dead band during the burn. The velocity e r r o r s  at cutoff (1 ft/sec in the 
The translational capability of the DAP was  also verified 
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X-axis and -1.36 ft/sec in the Z-ax i s )  were nulled by manual translation commands. 
Some cross  coupling was obtained between the spacecraft axes during the manual com- 
mands, but this effect was minimized by a subsequent design modification. 
The objective of the GNCS-controlled APS burn test was to perform a GNCS/DAP 
controlled long-duration APS burn. During the APS burn to depletion, the peak angular 
rates about the Q- and R-axes were of the order  of k 5 deg/sec which agreed with the 
predicted values. The larger  angular e r r o r  excursions were of the order  of t 2.5". 
The limit-cycle frequency was calculated during a steady-state portion of the burn. 
The observed limit-cycle frequency was 0.37 hertz for the pitch axis and 0.375 hertz 
for the roll axis. These values compared favorably with predicted values. 
The DAP performed well and maintained the appropriate dead bands within antic- 
ipated limits. Cross-axis velocity e r r o r s  at cutoff were nominal. Some c r o s s  coupling 
between the control axes was evident during this burn. This c r o s s  coupling caused 
some extra firings of the RCS, but these extra firings were against the offset accelera- 
tion and did not represent an inefficient u se  of fuel. Overall RCS-propellant consump- 
tion was as anticipated. 
The objectives of the GNCS undocked DPS performance test were to evaluate the 
capability of the GNCS to execute a DPS high-thrust-level, undocked maneuver and to  
execute an undocked DO1 maneuver. For the DPS phasing burn, the gimbal drive 
actuators appeared to have worked nominally in steering and tracking the center of 
gravity, even though a gimbal-fail indication occurred during the burn. The peak 
angular rates about the U and V control axes  during the burn were -1.22 and 0.78 deg/ 
sec, respectively. The peak attitude e r r o r s  for both axes were less than 1.75". The 
burn dead band was 1 " . In general, the maximum attitude e r r o r s  and attitude e r r o r s  
a t  maximum thrust for this burn were comparable to predicted results.  The burn used 
l e s s  RCS propellant than was anticipated. 
The DO1 burn was performed behind the moon, and no telemetry data were avail- 
able. The real-time data recorded for DO1 are presented in table VIII. The burn was 
nominal with no computer a l a rms  associated with control-system performance. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The history of the design and development of first-generation Apollo digital 
control systems has been presented in this report. Because of the design flexibility 
inherent in digital systems, increased emphasis will probably be placed upon digital- 
control-systems techniques fo r  future applications. 
Each digital autopilot flown on the Apollo vehicles is unique, either by reason of 
Therefore, each design represents a n  independent example of a digital autopilot 
completely different logic design or  of a completely different approach to the program- 
ing. 
that performed the design goals with minimal developmental problems. The number of 
versions flown (a total of 16) is impressive, and this degree of success  provides impor- 
tant information concerning the soundness of the basic approach of implementing all 
flight control-system logic and dynamic compensation functions in a digital computer. 
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Experience gained during the development of the Apollo digital autopilots may be 
used to avoid future design problems. Logical decision techniques should be applied 
with c a r e  in design development because conditions may exist in which these techniques 
may unexpectedly lock out entire system functions. The use of logic in avoiding de- 
graded performance has to be traded off with unintended restrictions. 
Further research effort  should be expended to develop additional analytical tech- 
niques for digital-control- system design. Adaptive design techniques making use  of 
the inherent flexibility available in digital systems should also be established. 
Design requirements should include the requirement to preserve the capability 
for monitoring system effectiveness. For example, efficient use of the delta-V capa- 
bility of the Apollo service propulsion system placed.only mild constraints on main- 
taining small  vehicle-attitude e r r o r s  and rates during the start transient; however, a 
design goal was to produce a system that minimized these start transients for nominal 
operation so that the transients would be useful indicators of off-nominal conditions 
that could be of serious coniequence. 
Caution must be exercised in the use of state variable estimation techniques 
because unmodeled process disturbances may allow divergence of the controlled 
quantity. 
Caution must also be exercised in placing too much reliance on simulation results 
for design verification without a full appreciation of the approximations that have been 
made in developing the process models and in implementing these models in the simu- 
lations. The latter becomes particularly important when simulating high-frequency 
dynamics in a digital computer. 
Manned Spac eci=af t Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 20, 1972 
914-50-30-02-72 
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